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Labor Unemployment Risk and CEO Incentive Compensation

作者: | 发布日期:2019-04-12 09:32:00
SPEAKER:?Kuo Zhang

张括博士现为上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院助理教授,他于2016年7月毕业于香港中文大学,获得金融学博士学位。主要研究方向为实证公司金融、兼并与收购以及企业创新行为等。他的研究成果发表在多个金融学和管理学国际期刊,包括Review of Financial StudiesJournal of Financial EconomicsJournal of Business Ethics曾获中国金融学年会最佳论文奖。

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CAFD SEMINAR SERIES 228
TOPIC: Labor Unemployment Risk and CEO Incentive Compensation
Abstract:?Unemployment risk influences workers’ incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital. In this paper, we investigate the impact of unemployment risk on CEO’s risk-taking incentive compensation. Exploiting state-level changes in unemployment benefits, we find that after unemployment insurance benefits become more generous, boards increase the convex payoff structure of CEO pay to encourage risk-taking. The increase in convexity payoff structures is stronger when CEO wealth is tied closely to firm performance and in labor-intensive industries, but attenuated by unionization. Our findings suggest that boards internalize labor market frictions in firms’ risk-taking decisions and executive compensation is one mechanism used.
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时间:2019年4月12日(星期五)下午14:00 – 15:30
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地点:学术会堂604
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主办方:best365信誉如何_best365还可以买足彩吗_best365合法吗
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(系列金融学术讲座由中央财经大学科研处专题讲座资助)